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Abstract. Nudges are often defended on the basis that they merely substitute 
existing influences on choice with other influences that are similar in kind; they 
introduce no new kind of influence into the choice situation. I motivate the view 
that, if this defence succeeds in establishing the moral innocuousness of typical 
nudges, it also establishes the moral innocuousness of an intuitively wrongful 
neurochemical intervention. I then consider two attempts to rebut this view and 
argue that both fail. I end by spelling out four stances that the proponent of the 
defence might adopt in response to my argument.  
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The staff in a University cafeteria wish to encourage healthier eating choices among 
customers. It happens that a recently discovered and safe drug is capable of 
augmenting a person’s motivation to eat healthy foods. When inhaled, the drug 
enters the motivational centres of the brain and chemically induces a mild desire to 
eat foods with certain flavours—flavours generally possessed by vegetables. 
Knowing these facts, cafeteria staff arrange to have the drug sprayed into the air 
via a sprinkler system. Though it is widely known that some cafeterias employ such 
strategies, and the spray is visible, most customers do not consider the possibility 
that this particular cafeteria might be employing such measures, and the cafeteria 
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staff do nothing to draw the measure to customers’ attention.ii The measure results 
in some customers choosing healthier options than they would otherwise have 
selected. 
 
Call the intervention described here Cafeteria Spray. Many philosophers—especially those 
operating primarily within a deontological framework—would think that Cafeteria Spray 
wrongs—that is, infringes a pro tanto duty owed to—the cafeteria’s customers, or at least, those 
among them whose choice is influenced by the measure and who do not consent to it.iii Indeed, 
there is now a burgeoning literature attempting to explain why, precisely, nonconsensual 
neurochemical interventions, of which Cafeteria Spray is an example, wrong their targets. These 
attempts appeal to the ways in which these interventions interfere with the bodies and minds of 
their targets, objectify those individuals, or bypass their psychological or rational faculties.iv 
 By contrast, many would find it less morally problematic were the cafeteria staff to 
realize the same outcome through nudging—that is, through (a) altering an individual’s 
environment, (b) in order to influence her choices, (c) by harnessing rapid, low-effort decision-
making heuristics, such as ‘choose what is most salient’, ‘stick with the default’ or ‘listen to 
people you recognise’. Consider this paradigmatic nudge, which I will call Cafeteria Nudge: 
The staff in a University cafeteria wish to encourage healthier eating choices among 
the cafeteria’s customers. Knowing that foods placed at eye-level will be more 
salient to customers than foods placed elsewhere, and that customers will thus be 
more inclined to choose those foods, they ensure that shelves at eye level are always 
filled with the healthiest options. Though it is widely known that some cafeterias 
employ such strategies, most customers do not consider the possibility that this 
particular cafeteria might be employing them, and the cafeteria staff do nothing to 
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draw the measure to customers’ attention. The measure results in some customers 
choosing healthier options than they would otherwise have selected.v  
Most would, I venture, find this intervention less morally troubling than Cafeteria Spray. Indeed, 
many commentators hold that nudges are typically morally innocuous, by which I mean that 
they do not wrong the nudgee. Several arguments have been offered in defence of this view.vi 
One of these—and the one that will be my focus—appeals to the claim that nudges typically 
influence the nudgees’ choices only in ways in which their choices would also have been 
influenced in the absence of the nudge. Typical nudges introduce no new kind of influence; 
they merely substitute one set of influences for another that is similar in kind.vii Discussing 
nudges that consist in altering the default option faced by the nudgee, one commentator puts it 
thus:  
it’s not the case that switching the default option introduces influences into a situation previously 
devoid of influences; it simply substitutes one set of influences for another. Alterations of the choice 
architecture thus need not reduce liberty, since the status quo contains patterns of influence that 
cannot be assumed to be innocent in this regard simply because they emerged in free market 
interactions.viii 
The argument of interest to me here can be characterised generically as follows:  
(1) For some intervention (or set of interventions) x, all of the influences that x exerts 
on individuals’ choices are influences of a kind that would also have been present 
in the absence of x. 
(2) An intervention does not wrong its target(s) if all of the influences it exerts on 
their choices are influences of a kind that would also have applied to those choices 
in the absence of the intervention.  
Therefore  
(3) Intervention (or set of interventions) x does not wrong its target(s).ix 
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I will refer to this argument as ‘the Mere Substitution Defence’ or sometimes simply ‘the 
Defence’, and to those who invoke it in support of typical nudges as ‘Nudge Defenders’. In this 
article, I argue that if the Defence succeeds in relation to typical nudges—that is, if it establishes 
that typical nudges are morally innocuous in the sense specified by (3)—then it also succeeds in 
relation to an intuitively wrongful neurochemical intervention.  
I begin, in the next section, by outlining how the Mere Substitution Defence might be 
applied to typical nudges, using Cafeteria Nudge as an exemplar. I then, in the subsequent section, 
motivate my view that if the Defence succeeds when applied to typical nudges, it also succeeds 
when applied to an intuitively wrongful neurochemical intervention: namely, Cafeteria Spray. 
Next, I consider two ways in which a Nudge Defender might seek to rebut this view, establishing 
that the Defence fails in relation to Cafeteria Spray, though not in relation to typical nudges. I 
argue that neither attempt succeeds in showing that the defence fails for all intuitively wrongful 
variants of Cafeteria Spray. Finally, I spell out the options that my argument leaves open to Nudge 
Defenders, suggesting that each involves a significant concession. 
Before proceeding to my argument, however, I must offer an important qualification. 
The Mere Substitution Defence relies on the thought that influences can be divided into kinds. 
But tricky questions will arise in individuating kinds of influence. Clearly, all nudges will 
introduce influences that differ in some minor descriptive ways from the influences that they 
replace. Consider again Cafeteria Nudge. There will presumably be many small differences 
between the influences introduced by Cafeteria Nudge and the influences that they replace. For 
example, it may be that one staff member, Jack, placed the healthy foods at eye level, whereas, 
had the nudge not been employed, another staff member, Jill, would have done the food 
placement. So the nudged customers are influenced by Jack, whereas they would otherwise 
have been influenced by Jill. Or it may be that the healthy foods were placed at eye level on a 
Tuesday, whereas the food arrangement would otherwise have been done on a Wednesday. 
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So, the nudged customers are subject to a Tuesday-originating influence, whereas they would 
otherwise have been subject to a Wednesday-originating influence.  
If the Mere Substitution Defence is to find any interesting application at all, minor 
descriptive differences such as these cannot be deemed to be differences in kind. Which 
differences should be counted as differences in kind, then? In the name of charity to Nudge 
Defenders, I will assume that only morally relevant differences should be counted, where a morally 
relevant difference is one that renders the substituting influence more morally problematic than 
the substituted influence. Differences that are not morally relevant need not trouble the 
proponent of the Defence since one cannot wrong someone by substituting for one influence 
another that is no more problematic. Or so I will assume. I will henceforth take it as read that 
differences in ‘kind’, for the purposes of the Mere Substitution Defence, must be morally 
relevant differences.   
 
The Mere Substitution Defence Applied to Nudging 
 
Nudge Defenders adduce the Mere Substitution Defence in support of typical nudges. In this 
section, I briefly illustrate how they might do so, using one typical nudge—Cafeteria Nudge—as 
an exemplar. Recall that Cafeteria Nudge involves arranging various meal offerings such that 
healthier foods lie at eye level, while less healthy foods are placed elsewhere. By increasing the 
salience of the heathy foods, it succeeds in influencing some customers to choose these foods 
when they would not otherwise have done so.  
 Does this intervention introduce a new kind of influence into the choice situation? 
Nudge Defenders will hold that it does not. They may note that some foods will need to be 
placed at eye level and some in other locations. Thus, some foods will be more salient than 
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others. The nudge merely arranges things such that this salience militates in favour of choosing 
the healthy option.  
However, as many protagonists in the philosophical debate on nudging have noticed, 
there is at least one significant—and possibly morally relevant—difference between the 
influences created by most nudges and the influences they replace. Whereas, the influences 
introduced by nudges, including Cafeteria Nudge, are created by others with the intention of 
influencing the choices or conduct of nudgees, the influences they replace are in many cases 
‘accidental’: they are either not the product of intentional action or not the product of an 
intention to influence choices. x   
Why think that this difference could be morally relevant? Perhaps because it could have 
an impact on autonomy. Some would argue that one is sometimes less autonomous when one 
is intentionally influenced by others than when one is influenced by accidental features of one’s 
situation, even if the influences are otherwise similar. This view is implied, for instance, by 
conceptions of autonomy according to which autonomy requires independence from the 
control, coercion or manipulation of others.xi It is also able to accommodate some widely held 
intuitions. As J. S. Blumenthal-Barby notes in discussing the distinction between accidental and 
intentional influences, “[t]o see the importance [of this distinction] we need only consider why 
it is that we think that something like slavery is so morally egregious: it is not just because the 
slave is not able to govern himself, it is because he is governed by someone else. The master has 
imposed his will on the slave in a way that the slave would not endorse.”xii It could be argued 
that, when one’s choices are influenced by the intentional actions of another agent, one’s 
choices may fail to be independent of her manipulation. In this vein, Till Grüne-Yanoff suggests 
that nudge polices “are manipulative [in part] because the government employs them with the 
intention of affecting people’s choices”,xiii while Daniel Hausman and Brynn Welch maintain 
that “[t]here remains an important difference between choices that are intentionally shaped 
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and choices that are not. Even when unshaped choices would have been just as strongly 
influenced by deliberative flaws, calculated shaping of choices still imposes the will of one agent 
on another.”xiv By contrast, merely allowing accidental influences to exert their effect arguably 
involves no control, coercion or manipulation. On certain conceptions of autonomy, then, 
nudges may sometimes replace less autonomy-threatening accidental influences with more 
autonomy-threatening (for example, because manipulative) intentional ones.xv 
There is also another important—and possibly morally relevant—way in which the 
influences introduced by nudges often differ from those they replace: they are likely to differ in 
direction.xvi That is, they are likely to militate in favour of different choices. Proponents of the 
Mere Substitution Defence often note that the direction of influences produced by a nudger 
could have come about accidentally. For example, the healthy foods could have been placed at 
eye level even if the foods were arranged randomly, and if they were, the customers would have 
been influenced in the precisely the same direction as they in fact were by the nudge. However, 
though this could have been the case, it will often not be true that it would have been the case. 
Instead, in many cases, the substituting influences will militate in favour of different choices 
than the substituted influences. In the absence of Cafeteria Nudge, it is likely that the food 
arrangement would have been different, and would have militated in favour of choosing 
different foods. Indeed, if there were not at least a chance that the nudge would alter the 
direction of influence, there would have been no point in pursuing it.  
As with the difference between accidental and intentional influences, it is possible that 
differences in direction of influence are, at least in some cases, morally relevant. Suppose an 
individual customer of our imagined cafeteria weakly but autonomously prefers to eat only 
unhealthy foods at the point at which he enters the cafeteria, and, as it happens, in the absence 
of Cafeteria Nudge, product placement would have militated in favour of his choosing unhealthy 
foods. Against this background, the influence introduced by Cafeteria Nudge, which favours the 
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selection of healthy foods, works against this customer’s autonomous preference, whereas the 
influence it replaces would have been aligned with the preference. xvii Though this will of course 
depend on precisely how we conceive of autonomy, it might follow that Cafeteria Nudge has 
compromised the autonomy of, and perhaps thereby wronged, this customer.  
How might Nudge Defenders respond to these observations? One option would be to 
severely restrict the scope of the Defence so that it applies only to cases in which, had the 
intervention not been employed, the targeted individuals would nevertheless have been 
subjected to intentional influences with the same direction. However, this would be a major 
concession; it would take almost all nudges beyond the scope of the Defence. More likely, then, 
Nudge Defenders will respond by denying that differences in intentionality and direction are 
always morally relevant, and thus that they always block the application of the Mere 
Substitution Defence to typical nudges. Typical nudges can alter the intentionality and 
direction of the influences exerted on nudgees while nevertheless falling within the scope of the 
Defence. 
 
The Mere Substitution Defence Applied to Cafeteria Spray 
 
We will return to this idea below. But for now, let us turn to consider the neurochemical 
intervention, Cafeteria Spray. Recall that Cafeteria Spray involves dispersing a drug that, when 
inhaled, chemically induces a mild desire to eat foods with certain flavours—flavours generally 
possessed by vegetables. Does this intervention fall within the scope of the Mere Substitution 
Defence?  
 It might initially seem obvious that it does not. It might seem that, in spraying the 
chemical into the air, cafeteria staff introduce a new kind of influence—an influence that differs 
in kind from the influences that would otherwise have been present.xviii Initial appearances can 
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be deceptive, however. In this section, I assume that the Mere Substitution Defence establishes 
the moral innocuousness of typical nudges, and explain why I think that, on this assumption, 
the Defence also establishes the moral innocuousness of Cafeteria Spray. To be clear, my 
argument in this section should be understood only as an attempt to motivate this view, not as a 
full defence of it; in the next section I will buttress the view by outlining and rebutting two 
attempts to refute it.  
 My argument begins with the observation that all of our choices are influenced by 
certain pre-existing motivational states and dispositions (henceforth simply ‘motivations’).  
Suppose that you are deciding between buying a bottle of water and a cup of coffee. You opt 
for the coffee. Clearly, in making this choice, you will be influenced by a range of pre-existing 
motivations such as your level of thirst, your desire to experience the taste of coffee and water, 
whether you plan to engage in activities that you think could be aided by a caffeine boost, and 
so on. Let us refer to these pre-existing motivations collectively as the motivational context of your 
choice.  
 This motivational context will be at least influenced (and perhaps determined) by 
chemical features of your brain, body and environment—by the chemical context of your choice. 
For instance, your level of thirst is influenced by the level of a hormone—angiotensin II—in 
the ventricles of your brain, which is in turn influenced by your blood pressure and the 
concentration of your bodily fluids, which are in turn influenced by the salt content of your 
food. More generally, the chemistry of our brains, bodies and environment influences the 
motivational context of our choices, and thus the choices themselves. 
 The influence of chemistry on our motivations, and thus choices, is clearest in cases 
where an unusual chemical state leads to unusual motivations, as, for example, where the 
hormones of early pregnancy lead to cravings for certain foods, very low blood sugar levels 
produce extreme hunger and impatience, or the administration of certain brain-active drugs 
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induces apathy. But work in psychology and neuroscience has also revealed numerous less 
obvious chemical influences on our motivations and thus choices. For example, research in 
empirical moral psychology has identified a role for the serotonergic neurotransmitter system 
in modulating motivations and decisions regarding whether to co-operate,xix how to respond to 
unfair treatment,xx and which option to take when presented with a putative moral dilemma.xxi 
Of course, from a philosophical standpoint, it should not be surprising that chemical factors 
affect our motivations; many accept that the mind supervenes on the physico-chemical 
properties of our brains, and even mind-body dualists, who reject this view, typically concede 
that bodily states can exert a causal influence on the mind, and thus on our choices.xxii 
 I take it to be clear, then, that our motivations, and thus choices, are influenced by 
chemical factors. In some rare cases, these chemical factors are deliberately controlled, either 
by ourselves or by others, for the purposes of influencing our motivation and thus choices. But 
for the most part, the chemical factors that bear on our motivations and choices are a matter 
of accident—they are determined either by genetic factors or by features of our environment 
that were not created with the intention of influencing our choices. Our choices are influenced 
by accidental chemical features of the world. 
 With these thoughts in mind, let us return to consider Cafeteria Spray. This intervention 
exerts an influence on the choices of customers exposed to it, and it does so through chemical 
means. However, in light of what has just been said, those customers’ choices would in any case 
have been subject to accidental chemical influences. The actions of the cafeteria staff simply 
replace one set of chemical influences with another. Of course, those new influences were 
intentional, whereas the chemical influences they replace were likely accidental. Moreover, they 
likely differ in direction. However, as we have seen, the analogous claims are true of many 
typical nudges also. To establish that typical nudges are morally innocuous, Nudge Defenders 
must allow that the differences in intentionality and direction are not—or not always—morally 
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relevant differences. Only then will they be entitled to claim that, though typical nudges often 
replace accidental with intentional influences on choice, they nevertheless introduce no new 
kind of influence, so the Mere Substitution Defence still applies. But on that assumption, it is 
not obvious why we should think that differences in intentionality and direction are morally 
relevant with respect to Cafeteria Spray. And if they are not, the Defence will, it seems, apply to 




An obvious objection to my argument of the previous section would hold that it relies on an 
overly coarse-grained account of the kind of intervention exemplified by Cafeteria Spray. I 
characterised that kind of intervention as a ‘chemical influence on motivation and thus choice’. 
But we could of course characterise it more narrowly. For example, we could characterise the 
kind of influence exemplified by Cafeteria Spray as the influence on motivation and thus choice 
of chemicals contained in airborne particles. Perhaps, had the cafeteria staff not released the spray, the 
cafeteria air would have contained no airborne particles of a kind that influence motivation. 
On this finer-grained specification of the kind of influence involved here, we can say that, had 
the cafeteria staff not pursued Cafeteria Spray, no influence of the same kind would have 
existed.xxiii  
 But recall that, to qualify as a difference in kind, the substituting and substituted 
influences must differ in a morally relevant way. Yet the present objection appears to invoke a 
morally irrelevant difference; it is not clear that or why it is more morally problematic to have 
one’s motivations influenced by chemicals contained in airborne particles than to have them 
influenced by non-airborne but otherwise similar chemical influences, such as chemicals on 
surfaces that are absorbed through the skin or chemicals in foods that we eat.xxiv  
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Our question, then, should be this: are there morally relevant differences between the 
influences introduced by Cafeteria Spray and those they replace? In what follows, I consider two 
attempts to show that there are, and thus to block the application of the Mere Substitution 
Defence to Cafeteria Spray. 
 
 
Differences in Strength and Phenomenal Character 
The first attempt appeals to the strength and phenomenal character of the influences 
introduced by Cafeteria Spray. It is natural to think that the influences introduced by Cafeteria 
Spray would be rather strong, and certainly stronger than the influences they replace. It is also 
plausible that they would differ in their phenomenal character—in how they feel to the 
customers. It may be, for example, that the motivations produced by the drug feel irresistible 
in a way that the motivations produced by the background chemical milieu do not. Perhaps 
these differences are morally relevant, and qualify as differences in kind.   
This suggestion faces at least two problems, however. First, it would, of course, be 
possible to more finely specify Cafeteria Spray such that the influences it introduces are neither 
stronger than, nor different in phenomenal character to, those they replace. There would then 
be no strength-based or phenomenal difference in kind between the substituted and substituting 
influences. The Mere Substitution Defence could then be applied to thus more fully specified 
variant of Cafeteria Spray, yielding the counter-intuitive result that it is not wrongful.  
Of course, it might be claimed that this is of no practical import: in almost all 
neurochemical interventions that might in fact be employed, there would be at least minor 
differences in phenomenal character and strength between the influences introduced by the 
intervention and those they replace. The chance that there is no difference is so small that, for 
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practical purposes, it can be ignored. And minor differences in strength and phenomenal 
character are, it might be claimed, sufficient to block the Mere Substitution Defence.  
However—and this brings us to the second problem—Nudge Defenders must allow 
that minor differences in strength or phenomenal character are morally irrelevant. If they do 
not, they will undermine their own defence of nudging since, though this has not been widely 
acknowledged,  many typical nudges will also create influences that are somewhat stronger than 
or different in phenomenal character to those they replace. Consider again Cafeteria Nudge. 
Suppose that, had this nudge not been employed, foods would have been distributed not in 
such a way as to produce healthy choices, but simply so as to minimise re-stocking time. This, 
let us suppose, would have resulted in bottles of water being placed at eye level. Would this 
have resulted in an influence identical in strength and phenomenal character to that actually 
exerted by the nudge—that is, the placement of healthy foods at eye level? Probably not. Most 
likely, the salience of bottled water placed at eye level will somewhat differ, in both its 
phenomenal character and motivational strength, from the salience of healthy foods placed in 
the same position.  
Given possibilities such as this, Nudge Defenders must hold that, at least within a certain 
range, differences in strength and phenomenal character are not morally relevant. But on that 
view, if Cafeteria Spray, or any other neurochemical intervention, produced influences that differ 
only slightly in strength or phenomenal character from those they replace, which it clearly 
might, then the difference will be morally irrelevant, and the Mere Substitution Defence can 
still apply.   
 
Intentional Bodily Influence 
A second attempt to block the application of the Mere Substitution Defence to Cafeteria Spray 
would appeal to the role of the body in mediating the influence exerted by this intervention. 
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The influences introduced by Cafeteria Spray were produced via intentionally and directly (that is, 
without psychological mediation) influencing bodily states. The cafeteria staff intentionally alter the 
customers’ neurochemical, and thus bodily, states. Moreover, they alter them not by engaging 
psychological processes, such as perception, but through brute physico-chemical 
mechanisms—mechanisms with no psychological correlates. By contrast, the influences that 
are replaced by this intervention—the background chemical influences on motivation—were 
not, we may assume, produced via intentional and direct bodily influence.  
This difference may be morally relevant, since it may affect whether the right to bodily 
integrity is implicated. A right to bodily integrity, understood here as a right against bodily 
interference,xxv is widely accepted in moral, legal, and political philosophy, where it has played 
an especially prominent role in discussions of the wrongfulness of nonconsensual sex, organ 
harvesting and medical intervention. xxvi  Intentionally and directly influencing a person’s 
internal bodily chemistry, at least when done without that person’s consent, is often thought to 
infringe a person’s right to bodily integrity. So the influences introduced by Cafeteria Spray might 
be thought to infringe this right. On the other hand, merely allowing accidental features of a 
person’s bodily and environmental chemical milieu to exert an influence would not standardly 
be taken to infringe this right. This suggests that the background influences replaced by Cafeteria 
Spray would not infringe this right. Cafeteria Spray may, then, infringe the customers’ rights, and 
in a way that they would not, in the absence of the nudge, have been infringed; it may substitute 
bodily-integrity-infringing for non-bodily-integrity-infringing forms of influence.   
Perhaps here we have found a way of blocking the application of the Mere Substitution 
Defence to Cafeteria Spray. If we have, we will also, I think, have found a way of morally 
separating Cafeteria Spray from typical nudges, for typical nudges surely do not infringe the right 
to bodily integrity. Of course, insofar as nudges affect the mind, and the mind supervenes on 
the brain, nudges affect neural, and thus bodily, states. But it is doubtful that they are intended 
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to do so, and it is doubtful that the right to bodily integrity protects against unintended bodily 
influence. Furthermore, the bodily alterations produced by nudging are produced by engaging 
psychological processes, whereas the right to bodily integrity is normally understood as 
protecting only against direct influence on the body. This gives us a further reason to deny that 
nudges infringe the right to bodily integrity.  
Appealing to the right to bodily integrity to explain the wrongfulness of Cafeteria Spray 
is, however, a risky strategy for the Nudge Defender to take, for though nudges do not infringe 
the right to bodily integrity as it is normally understood, they plausibly do infringe the deeper 
rights which ground bodily integrity.  
Let me explain. The right to bodily integrity is seldom taken to be a rock-bottom feature 
of morality. Rather, it is normally thought to derive from some deeper right(s), such as rights of 
personal sovereignty or personal autonomy (henceforth, ‘rights over the person’).xxvii On this 
view, to infringe the right to bodily integrity is just to infringe rights over the person, and to do 
so in a particular kind of way—by interfering with the person’s body. However, rights over the 
person can also be infringed by influences that do not interfere with the body. And indeed, they 
are precisely the rights that many opponents of nudging would claim are threatened by nudges 
by virtue of the way in which nudges interfere with our motivations and choices. Those 
opponents claim that, in replacing accidental with intentional influences on motivation and 
choice, nudges replace influences that do not infringe rights over the person with influences 
that—perhaps because they are manipulative—do.   
Of course, Nudge Defenders can deny this. They can deny that intentional influences 
on motivation always infringe rights over the person. But can they do so in a way that is 
consistent with holding that the bodily influence introduced in Cafeteria Spray does infringe such 
rights?  
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Those who defend nudging against personal autonomy- or personal sovereignty-based 
objections normally do so by arguing that, within certain constraints—which nudges typically 
satisfy—influencing another’s motivations does not threaten such autonomy or sovereignty—
at least, not to the degree that it infringes any right over the person. The most frequently 
mentioned constraints are that the influence must be type-transparent (i.e., people must be made 
aware of the fact that influences of this type are sometimes employed),xxviii that it must be easy 
to avoid, xxix  and that it must not harness any irrationality in the influencee. xxx  However, if 
influences on motivation infringe no rights over the person when they meet these criteria, we 
might suspect that the same will be true of influences on the body when they meet analogous 
criteria. Moreover, it is plausible that the bodily influences introduced in Cafeteria Spray could 
meet these criteria. There seems no reason to suppose that Cafeteria Spray harnesses any 
irrationality.xxxi And if we suppose that the government informs citizens that some cafeterias 
are using this spray, and that it is easy for customers to avoid such cafeterias—for example, by 
asking staff whether they are employing the spray, and dining elsewhere if they are—then the 
type transparency and easy avoidability conditions will also be met. Nevertheless, it is intuitively 
plausible that this version of Cafeteria Spray remains wrongful.  
The challenge for proponents of the Mere Substitution Defence is, then, to explain why 
the intentional, direct influence on the body introduced in Cafeteria Spray infringes rights over 
the person, even when it is type-transparent, easy to avoid and harnesses no irrationality, yet 
the intentional influences on motivation and choice introduced by typical nudges do not 
infringe those rights. Perhaps proponents of the Mere Substitution Defence will be able to 
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I have now motivated the view that, if the Mere Substitution Defence succeeds in relation to 
typical nudges, then it also succeeds in relation to Cafeteria Spray. I have also considered two 
attempts to refute that view. I argued that these attempts fail to block the application of the 
Defence to at least some intuitively wrongful variants of Cafeteria Spray—namely, those in which 
the chemical influences introduced by the spray differ only slightly in strength and phenomenal 
character from background chemical influences, and in which the intervention is type-
transparent, easy to avoid, and harnesses no irrationality.   
How might a Nudge Defender respond to my argument? There are four broad routes 
available.  
 One option would be to bite the bullet—to accept that the relevant variants of Cafeteria 
Spray are morally innocuous: they do not wrong those whom they target, counterintuitive as 
this may be.  
 Another option would be to concede that some typical nudges do wrong those subjected 
to them—to concede, in other words, that the Mere Substitution Defence fails in its original 
application. For example, one could allow that typical nudges wrong those subjected to them 
whenever they replace accidental with intentional influences.  
 I take it that the Nudge Defender will find neither of these options attractive; she will 
want to sustain the view that typical nudges are morally innocuous without being committed to 
the moral innocuousness of any intuitively wrongful variants of Cafeteria Spray. This brings us to 
the third option: the Nudge Defender might confront my argument head-on. She might seek 
to establish, contrary to my argument in the previous section, that, whereas typical nudges fall 
within the scope of the Mere Substitution Defence, intuitively wrongful variants of Cafeteria Spray 
do not. 
 The most promising variant of this strategy would, I think, develop the line that we were 
pursuing at the end of the previous section.  The Nudge Defender might seek to show that 
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intentional and direct influences on the body threaten rights over the person in a way that 
intentional influences on motivation do not. However, considerable further philosophical work 
would need to be done to establish this result, and I see no reason to assume in advance that 
this project will succeed.  
 Finally, the fourth option would be for the Nudge Defender to simply insist—without 
arguing—that the influences introduced by Cafeteria Spray differ in kind from those that they 
replace, whereas those introduced by typical nudges do not. In defence of this view, she might 
note that it aligns well with widely shared intuitions. Many people will, I suppose, intuit that 
Cafeteria Nudge merely substitutes influences but Cafeteria Spray does not. This, the Nudge 
Defender might claim, puts the burden of proof on anyone who wishes to deny that there is a 
difference between these interventions with respect to the Mere Substitution Defence.    
 However, this response also comes at a significant cost. We do not, in philosophy, 
typically take bare intuition as fully satisfactory basis for accepting a view. We have a stronger 
basis for accepting an intuitively plausible view when we can also offer a philosophical rationale 
for the view, and a weaker basis when we lack one. Taking this fourth response, then, leaves 
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ii I make the stipulations contained in this sentence and the previous two in order to ensure that the intervention 
described in this case is analogous to typical nudges, with which I will compare it below, in three important ways: 
it is ‘type-transparent’ (infra, note xxiv) and avoidable, though not clearly consensual.  
iii On some accounts of rights, to wrong a person—viz., to infringe a pro tanto duty owed to her—is to infringe her 
rights, but I will not commit myself to such accounts. Nevertheless, I will assume that infringing someone’s rights 
is one way of wronging her. I use the term ‘wrongful’ to refer to actions that wrong someone. Thus, on my usage, 
wrongfulness is different from wrongness. Wrongness implies all-things-considered impermissibility, whereas 
wrongfulness does not.  
iv  See, for example, Jan Christoph Bublitz and Reinhard Merkel, ‘Crimes Against Minds: On Mental 
Manipulations, Harms, and a Human Right to Mental Self-Determination’ Criminal Law and Philosophy, 8, 1 (2014): 
51-77; Jan Christoph Bublitz, ‘Moral Enhancement and Mental Freedom’ Journal of Applied Philosophy, 33, 1 (2016): 
88-106; Elizabeth Shaw, ‘Direct Brain Interventions and Responsibility Enhancement’ Criminal Law and Philosophy, 
8, 1 (2014): 1–20; Elizabeth Shaw, ‘The Use of Brain Interventions in Offender Rehabilitation Programs: Should 
It Be Mandatory, Voluntary, or Prohibited?’ in Jens Clausen and Neil Levy (eds.) Handbook of Neuroethics 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2015), pp. 1381-98; Christopher Bennett, ‘Intrusive Intervention and Opacity Respect’ in 
David Birks and Thomas Douglas (eds.) Treatment for Crime (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 256-74. 
These works all consider the use of nonconsensual neurochemical interventions for the purposes of crime 
prevention or criminal rehabilitation, and within the context of criminal justice. However, if nonconsensual 
neurochemical interventions are wrongful in criminal justice contexts, in which those subject to them might be 
thought to have made themselves liable to certain intrusive interventions, it is very plausible that they would be 
wrongful also in many other contexts. And indeed objections have also been discussed—though somewhat less 
fully—to nonconensual neurochemical interventions employed for other purposes and in other contexts, including 
to treat psychiatric disorders and manipulate the outcomes of elections. See, for example, M. Sjöstrand and G. 
Helgesson, ‘Coercive Treatment and Autonomy in Psychiatry’, Bioethics, 22, 2 (2008): 113–20; Norbert Paulo and 
Christoph Bublitz, ‘Pow(d)er to the People? Voter Manipulation, Legitimacy, and the Relevance of Moral 
Psychology for Democratic Theory’, Neuroethics, 12, 1 (2019): 55–71. 
v This case is modified from Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, 
and Happiness (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), at pp.1-2. 
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vi T. Martin Wilkinson, ‘Nudging and Manipulation’ Political Studies, 61, 2 (2013): 341-55; Daniel M. Hausman 
and Brynn Welch ‘Debate: To Nudge or Not to Nudge’  Journal of Political Philosophy, 18, 1 (2010): 123-36; Richard 
H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein ‘Libertarian Paternalism’ American Economic Review, 93, 2 (2003): 175-9; Joel 
Anderson, ‘Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness, Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein 
(Yale University Press, 2008), pp. x + 293 pages. [Paperback edition, Penguin, 2009, 320 pages.]’ Economics and 
Philosophy, 26, 3 (2010): 369–76. 
vii Thaler and Sunstein 2003 op. cit. note v, at p. 175; Thaler and Sunstein 2008 op. cit. note v, at pp. 2-4, p. 243, 
p. 247; Anderson op. cit. note vi, at pp. 372-73; Hausman and Welch op. cit. note vi, at pp. 132-3. Note that, as I 
understand it, it does not follow from the claim that nudges introduce no new kind of influence that they introduce 
no new object or feature into the nudgee’s environment. Suppose that supermarket staff place colourful nutritional 
labels on food shelves where previously there were no labels. The staff have introduced new objects and features 
into the customers’ environment. Nevertheless, I take it to be possible that no new kind of influence is produced. It 
may be that the impact of the nutritional labels on customers’ choices merely replaces a similar impact that some 
other existing feature of their environment—perhaps the food packaging itself—would otherwise have had.   
viii Anderson op. cit. note vi. 
ix The conclusion of this argument is not normally explicitly stated. Some have seemed prepared to conclude, 
partly on the basis of (1), that the specified interventions are entirely morally unproblematic or ethically ‘neutral’. 
See, for example, Kalle Grill’s interpretation of Thaler and Sunstein’s version of the argument, in Kalle Grill, 
‘Expanding the Nudge: Designing Choice Contexts and Choice Contents’ Rationality, Markets and Morals, 5, 90 
(2014): 139–62, at pp. 142-3. I will, conservatively, attribute to proponents of the argument only the weaker 
conclusion that the interventions are in one particularly important respect unproblematic: they do not wrong those whom 
they target (that is, they are not, in my sense of the term, wrongful). 
x See, for example, Daniel M. Hausman and Brynn Welch, ‘Debate: To Nudge or Not to Nudge’, Journal of 
Political Philosophy 18, 1 (2010): 123–36, esp. at p. 133; Till Grüne-Yanoff, ‘Old Wine in New Casks: Libertarian 
Paternalism Still Violates Liberal Principles’, Social Choice and Welfare 38, 4 (2012): 635–45; J. S. Blumenthal-Barby, 
‘A Framework for Assessing the Moral Status of ‘Manipulation’’ in C. Coons and M. Weber (eds.) Manipulation: 
Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 121–34, at pp. 125-6; Jens Kipper, ‘Irresistible 
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Nudges, Inevitable Nudges, and the Freedom to Choose’ Moral Philosophy and Politics, (forthcoming): 
doi:10.1515/mopp-2020-0013: 11-19, see especially at pp. 11-12. 
xi Matthew Clayton, Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), at p. 104; Matthew 
Clayton, ‘Individual Autonomy and Genetic Choice’ in Justine Burley and John Harris (eds.) A Companion to 
Genethics (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 191-205, at p. 201; Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1986) at pp. 377-8; Neil C. Manson and Onora O’Neill, Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), at p. 18. On an alternative view, what matters is not whether 
one is subjected to controlling influence by others, but whether one is influenced in a way that one resisted or 
would have resisted had one noticed it. See, for the classic statement of this view, John Christman, ‘Autonomy 
and Personal History’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 21, 1 (1991): 1-24, at p. 11. I do not discuss this view further, 
but I hope it will be clear that my arguments below apply equally to it. 
xii Blumenthal-Barby, op. cit. note x, p. 126. 
xiii Grüne-Yanoff, op. cit. note x, p. 636.  
xiv Hausman and Welch, op. cit. note x, p. 133. 
xv As Kipper (op. cit. note x, pp. 11-12) notes, replacing accidental with intentional influences might also diminish 
autonomy for other reasons (for example, the intentional influences will be more difficult to resist than the 
accidental influences) or might wrong the nudgee other than by diminishing her autonomy (for example, by failing 
to treat her with respect and dignity).  
xvi  This difference has been less frequently noted in the literature on nudging than the difference between 
accidental and intentional influences, perhaps because it is generally assumed that the direction of influence in 
nudging is unproblematic. But see, for an article that does acknowledge this difference, and its potential moral 
relevance, Adrien Barton and Till Grüne-Yanoff, ‘From Libertarian Paternalism to Nudging—and Beyond’, 
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 6, 3 (2015): 341–59, at p. 348.  
xvii On some conceptions of nudging, nudges necessarily militate in favour of choices that conform to the agent’s 
own reasons. The intervention I describe here may fail to qualify as a nudge, on this conception, though this will 
depend on how, exactly, we understand reasons. For example, if reasons are understood as objective normative 
considerations—normative considerations that are constitutively independent of a person’s contingent 
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preferences—then this intervention may militate in favour of conformity to reasons even though it acts against the 
nudgee’s prior preferences.   
xviii Admittedly, it could be objected that, had the cafeteria staff not released the spray, they would have been 
influencing the customers through maintaining the absence of the spray and thus, relatively speaking, favouring 
less healthy food choices. That influence, it might further be maintained, is of the same kind as the influence 
introduced by Cafeteria Spray. Note, however, that if this objection is generalized, so as to hold that omitting to 
introduce intervention x constitutes an influence of the same kind as introducing intervention x, then the Mere 
Substitution Defence will, implausibly, apply to any intervention that influences a person's choices. 
xix Brian Knutson, Owen M. Wolkowitz, Steve W. Cole, Theresa Chan, Elizabeth A. Moore, Ronald C. Johnson, 
Jan Terpstra, et al., ‘Selective Alteration of Personality and Social Behavior by Serotonergic Intervention’ American 
Journal of Psychiatry, 155, 3 (1998): 373–9; Wai S. Tse and Alyson J. Bond, ‘Serotonergic Intervention Affects Both 
Social Dominance and Affiliative Behavior’ Psychopharmacology, 161, 3 (2002): 324–30; Wai S. Tse and Alyson J. 
Bond, ‘Reboxetine Promotes Social Bonding in Healthy Volunteers’ Journal of Psychopharmacology, 17, 2 (2003): 
189–95; Richard M. Wood, James K. Rilling, Alan G. Sanfey, Zubin Bhagwagar, and Robert D. Rogers, ‘Effects 
of Tryptophan Depletion on the Performance of an Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game in Healthy Adults’ 
Neuropsychopharmacology, 31, 5, (2006): 1075–84. 
xx Molly J. Crockett, Luke Clark, Golnaz Tabibnia, Matthew D. Lieberman, and Trevor W. Robbins, ‘Serotonin 
Modulates Behavioral Reactions to Unfairness’ Science, 320, 5884 (2008): 1739; Molly J. Crockett, Annemieke 
Apergis-Schoute, Benedikt Herrmann, Matthew D. Liberman, Ulrich Müller, Trevor W. Robbins, and Luke 
Clark, ‘Serotonin Modulates Striatal Responses to Fairness and Retaliation in Humans’ Journal of Neuroscience, 33, 
8 (2013): 3505-13. 
xxi Molly J. Crockett, Luke Clark, Marc D. Hauser, and Trevor W. Robbins, ‘Serotonin Selectively Influences 
Moral Judgment and Behavior Through Effects on Harm Aversion’ Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of 
the United States of America, 107, 40 (2010): 17433-8. 
xxii Leibniz famously subscribed to a view which denies this: mind-body parallelism. He held that, though mental 
and physical events seem to cause one another, this is only because God has pre-established a harmony between 
them: in fact, all mental events have only mental causes, and bodily events have only bodily causes. (See, Gottfried 
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Wilhelm von Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (ed. and trans.), (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1989), esp. at p. 223.) I cannot go into the arguments for and against mind-body parallelism here. I hope it suffices 
merely to note that it is not a popular philosophical position. Mind-body dualism—according to which the mind 
and body are separate substances—is somewhat more popular. However, mind-body dualism is consistent with 
the view that mental events have bodily causes, and most adherents to it have accepted as much. One prominent 
variety of dualism allows that mental and bodily events may cause one another (interactionism), while another 
(epiphenomenalism) holds that mental events are caused by physical events but not the reverse.  
xxiii Interestingly, it is not obvious that this objection is empirically warranted. There is growing evidence that 
common airborne pollutants can influence brain structure and function, in some cases with measurable 
psychological effects. See Jiu-Chiuan Chen, Xinhui Wang, Gregory A. Wellenius, Marc L. Serre, Ira Driscoll, 
Ramon Casanova, John J. McArdle, et al., ‘Ambient Air Pollution and Neurotoxicity on Brain Structure: Evidence 
from Women’s Health Initiative Memory Study’ Annals of Neurology, 78, 3 (2015): 466-76; Lilian Calderón-
Garcidueñas, Aristo Vojdani, Eleonore Blaurock-Busch, Yvette Busch, Albrecht Friedle, Maricela Franco-Lira, 
Partha Sarathi-Mukherjee, et al., ‘Air Pollution and Children: Neural and Tight Junction Antibodies and 
Combustion Metals, the Role of Barrier Breakdown and Brain Immunity in Neurodegeneration’ Journal of 
Alzheimer’s Disease, 43, 3 (2015): 1039-58; Tamara Schikowski, Mohammad Vossoughi, Andrea Vierkötter, Thomas 
Schulte, Tom Teichert, Dorothee Sugiri, Karin Fehsel, et al., ‘Association of Air Pollution with Cognitive Functions 
and its Modification by APOE Gene Variants in Elderly Women’ Environmental Research, 142 (2015): 10-16. 
xxiv There may be cases in which this distinction is morally relevant in a derivative sense. Suppose A has promised 
B not to influence her through the release of airborne particles; in this context, the normative status of an influence 
applied by A on B may clearly depend on whether the influence involves the release of airborne particles. However, 
in this case the moral relevance of the distinction derives from the more fundamental moral relevance of the 
distinction between promise-violating and promise-respecting forms of influence. My claim is merely that the 
distinction between chemical influence via airborne droplets and other forms of chemical influence is obviously 
not in itself—that is, nonderivatively—morally relevant.   
xxv Other terms have also been used to refer to what I am calling the right to bodily integrity. For instance, it is 
sometimes referred to as a right against bodily ‘trespass’, especially when it is taken to derive from rights of self-
ownership or personal sovereignty. See, Judith Jarvis Thomson, ‘Trespass and First Property’, in her The Realm 
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of Rights (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 205-226; David Archard, ‘Informed Consent: 
Autonomy and Self-Ownership’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 25, 1 (2008): 19–34. Conversely, ‘the right to 
bodily integrity’ has been used to refer to several other kinds of right over the body and is often used without its 
precise content being specified. See, for discussion, A. M. Viens, ‘The Right to Bodily Integrity’, in Andreas von 
Arnauld, Kerstin von der Decken and Mart Susi (eds) Cambridge Handbook of New Human Rights (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2020); W. Dekkers, C. Hoffer and J. P. Wils, ‘Bodily Integrity and Male and Female 
Circumcision’, Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 8, 2 (2005): 179–91. 
xxvi For examples of explicit invocations of the right in relation to organ harvesting, see S. Wilkinson, and E. 
Garrard, ‘Bodily Integrity and the Sale of Human Organs’, Journal of Medical Ethics, 22, 6 (1996): 334-9, at p. 338 
(“[o]ne way of explaining the moral significance of organ removal is by appealing to the notion of bodily integrity”); 
and T. M. Wilkinson, Ethics and the Acquisition of Organs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), at p. 16 (“[t]he 
right to bodily integrity ... is almost entirely uncontroversial and often considered of great weight”). 
xxvii  See, for example, Thomson 1990, op. cit. note xxv; Arthur Ripstein, ‘Beyond the Harm Principle’, Philosophy 
& Public Affairs, 34, 3 (2006): 215–45; Archard 2008, op. cit. note xxv. 
xxviii For the classic discussion of this requirement, see Luc Bovens, ‘The Ethics of Nudge’, T. Grüne-Yanoff & S. 
Hansson (eds.), Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009): 207–19. 
xxix See, for discussion of this requirement, Thaler and Sunstein 2008, op. cit. note v, at p. 6; Y. Saghai, ‘Salvaging 
the Concept of Nudge’, Journal of Medical Ethics, 39, 8, (2013): 487-93. 
xxx See, for discussion of this requirement, B. Engelen, ‘Nudging and Rationality: What Is There to Worry?’, 
Rationality and Society, 31, 2 (2019): 204–32; A. T. Schmidt, ‘Getting Real on Rationality—Behavioral Science, 
Nudging, and Public Policy’, Ethics, 129, 4, (2019): 511–43.  
xxxi Schmidt 2019 (op cit. note xxx) offers an argument for the view that paradigmatic nudges, such as Cafeteria Nudge, 
need harness no irrationality, and there is nothing in his argument to prevent it carrying over to Cafeteria Spray.  
